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Case No. 20080435-CA
IN THE

U T A H U T A H COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Armand Kwanza Brown,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an order for restitutition on a conviction for burglary
and aggravated assault. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-4103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Does the judgment incorrectly reflect a conviction for aggravated burglary
where Defendant unambiguously pleaded guilty to simple burglary?
Standard of Review. The State concedes that the case should be remanded for
the entry of a corrected judgment for burglary on Count I.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that defendant pay
restitution for the victim's relocation costs stemming from a battery and assault?

Standard of Review. 'Trial courts are vested with wide latitude and discretion
in sentencing,. . . and we will not disturb a trial court's restitution order unless it
exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion." State v. Corbitt,
2003 UT App 417, f 6,82 P.3d 211 (citations omitted). '"[T]he exercise of discretion
in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the
appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court/" Id. (quoting State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)) (brackets in original).
STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A:
§ 63-25a-403, -408, -411 (West 2004);
§ 63M-7-503 (West Supp. 2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-101 (West 2004), -102, -302 (West Supp. 2008);
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, no
contact order violation, assault, and damage to or interruption of a communication
device. Rl-2. He waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over. R23.
Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and aggravated assault, and the State agreed

2

to dismiss the remaining charges. R26. The trial court ordered a presentence
investigation report and, later, a diagnostic evaluation. R24, 39.!
On August 24, 2007, the court sentenced defendant to a one-to-fifteen-year
term on the burglary conviction and a zero-to-five-year term on the aggravated
assault conviction. R57. The court suspended both prison terms, placed defendant
on probation for thirty-six months, and ordered defendant to pay full restitution.
R57-58. The judgment directed the State to submit an order for restitution within
180 days. R58.
On April 25, 2008, 185 days after defendant was sentenced, the State
submitted a motion and order for restitution to the victims in the amount of
$2,970.72. R61-64. Attached to the motion and order were Restitution/Subrogation
Notices from the Office of Crime Victims Reparations (OCVR) detailing 'Verified
expenses incurred by the victims/' R65-69. Following a hearing, on April 18,2008,
the court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount requested. R89.
Defendant timely appealed the restitution order. R91.

A copy of the presentence investigation report is contained in an
unnumbered envelope; the diagnostic evaluations of Aaron M. Zimmer, Adult
Probation and Parole Investigator, and Tanya Colledge, Psy. D., are contained in a
numbered envelope (R48). Those documents are cited as "PSI," "DEV/Z," and
"DEV/C," respectively.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS 2
The Incident
The Probable Cause Statement describes Defendant's offenses:
"The City of South Salt Lake served a No Contact Order, case #C06-01657, on
the Defendant, ARMAND KWANZ A BROWN, on June 13,2006, which was still in
effect on January 23,2007. See Probable Cause Statement, R3. The No Contact order
states that the Defendant will have absolutely no personal contact with Cheree
Weatherspoon." Id.
"Spring Weatherspoon states that on January 23, 2007, the Defendant,
ARMAND KWANZA BROWN, came to her home at 2803 South Adams Street, Salt
Lake County, where she lives with her daughter, Cheree Weatherspoon. Id. The
Defendant started banging on the door and windows wanting Cheree to open the
door. Id. Cheree opened the door and told the Defendant to leave. Id. The
Defendant walked in the house, uninvited, and hit Cheree in the face. Id. When
Spring tried to intervene, the Defendant hit Spring with a radio, and threw a
drinking glass at her. Id. The glass cut Spring's hand. Spring had a laceration on
her hand." Id.

The facts are taken from the probable cause statement (R3-4), the
presentence investigation report (PSI), the diagnostic evaluations (DEV/Z and
DEV/C), a memorandum written by Mr. Zimmer on August 21,2007 (R49), and the
transcript of the sentencing and the restitution hearings (R107).
4

' T h e Defendant walked outside and Cheree shut the door. Id. The Defendant
started yelling at Cheree to open the back door. Id. Cheree would not open the
door, so the Defendant kicked in the back door and entered the home/ 7 Id.
' T h e Defendant started beating on Cheree and threatened to kill her. As
Officers arrived, the Defendant ran on foot, taking Cheree's cell phone with him so
that she could not call the police/' R4.
Both victims were transported to St. Marks Hospital for their injuries. PSI:3.
Defendant is six feet tall and weighs approximately 245 pounds. DEV/G2.
The Legal and Factual Bases of the Guilty Plea
In pleading guilty, Defendant admitted that, as to burglary, "[he] entered or
remained unlawfully in the dwelling of another with intent to commit assault/ 7
R27. He also admitted that, as to aggravated assault, "[he] threatened with the use
of unlawful force causing bodily injury to another." Id. The factual basis for the
pleas was that he "entered the home of his girlfriend without permission and got in
a fight with her mother, Spring Weatherspoon, who received a cut to her hand/' Id.
ThePSI
While being evaluated by Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P), Defendant was
involved in a fight with another inmate, which resulted in his being housed in the
Salt Lake County Jail's Maximum Security pod. PSL2. The investigator reported as
follows: "During the interview, the Defendant accepted little responsibility for his
actions in this matter. He blamed the victims for attacking him by jumping on him,
5

and throwing water and a glass jar at him. It is clear the Defendant has an anger
problem and is quick to exhibit violent behavior/' PSL2.
The investigator's opinion concerning Defendant's anger problem and
propensity to act violently is supported by Defendant's adult criminal record:

Date

Offense

Disposition

•

4/23/02

Battery/spouse

Convicted

•

8/30/04

Battery/Fmr spouse

No information

•

12/23/04

Battery

Warrant

•

1/28/06

Interfering W/Police, Misd
Obstructing justice, Misd

No information

•

6/19/06

Simple Assault, MA
Plea in abeyance
Viol Prot Order, MA
Dismissed
Threat Against Life/Prop, MA Dismissed

•

9/14/06

Viol No Contact Order, MA
Interfere W/Police, MB
False Info to Police, MC

Convicted
Convicted
Convicted

•

1/25/07

Agg Burglary, F2
Agg Assault, F3

Current case

PSI:4.
Also, an order to show cause had issued on Defendant's 2006 plea in abeyance
on simple assault. PST.4.
Defendant admitted that he entered Cheree's home because he was upset
with her: "The reason this all happened was because I was coming to her house off

6

of work and I had seen a black guy parking outside of the house and I thought that
she was seeing him steady me [sic] trying to talk to her I just started yelling and one
thing led to another

" PSL3.

AP&P recommended that Defendant be ordered to complete a 60-day
Diagnostic Evaluation at the Utah State Prison. PSI:1.
The Diagnostic

Evaluations

Defendant was arrested and booked into jail on January 25, 2007, and he
remained in custody until sentencing, on August 24,2007. R39-40,56; DEV/Z:1. On
June 1,2007, the court ordered that Defendant receive a diagnostic evaluation. R39.
In her evaluation, Dr. Tanya Colledge noted Defendant's history of violence:
Defendant reported "a history of having been suspended for fighting" in high
school and of "domestic violence with a former girlfriend." DEV/C4. She noted
that Defendant "does not exhibit a normal regard for traditional social standards
and values," and that he "likely has a history of difficulty w i t h . . . the legal system.
Id. at 4. Dr. Colledge commented that Defendant "has developed quite a history of
violence for someone so young with at least four battery/assault charges and
several violations of a protective or no contact order." Id. at 5. She opined that
Defendant "is in need of a significant anger management treatment program." Id. at

7

5. Dr. Colledge's DSM IV diagnostic impression was that Defendant suffered from
"Personality Disorder NOS with Antisocial Features/' Id.3
The evaluation of Mr. Zimmer, the Diagnostic Investigator, reflects that
Defendant failed to personally invest himself in the diagnostic process, refusing to
disclose much, if any, detail of his crimes or drug use, expressing little empathy for
his victims, and revealing little comprehension of or insight into how his thinking
contributed to his criminal lifestyle. DEV/Z:3-4. Among the most prominent of
Defendant's "thinking errors" was his "criminal anger," which made him
"aggressive, vengeful, and [ready to] suddenly lash out at innocent victims." Id. at
4. Mr. Zimmer noted that" [o]ne of the more obvious areas of concern regarding the
defendant includes his propensity for violence" (id. at 5)—while incarcerated for this
offense, Defendant was counseled for "strong-arming" and "intimidating other
inmates." See Mr. Zimmer's Memorandum of August 21, 2007, R49. Mr. Zimmer
concluded his Evaluative Summary with the following remarks:
While at the Diagnostic Unit, Mr. Brown's performance, insight, and
attitude have all been poor. We are not overly optimistic with his
3

"DSM" is an abbreviation for "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual." See
http://www.dsmivtr.org/. "NOS" is an abbreviation for "not otherwise specified."
See SOCIAL WORKER'S DESK REFERENCE 184 (Albert R. Roberts, Gilbert J. Greene, eds.
Oxford University Press eds. 2002) ("Each class of disorders [set out in the DSM IV]
has at least one class of 'not otherwise specified' (NOS) category. This category . . .
is given when the person has unique features which are within the range of the class
but do not precisely fit the category.")
8

ability, or desire, to successfully change his life at this time. His
history, and current attitude and actions suggest he will continue in the
same pattern. Our concern is with the defendant's increasing risk to
the community, and believe this must be taken into consideration.
DEV/Z5.
The Sentencing
At the sentencing, defense counsel referred to the PSI and Mr. Zimmer's
diagnostic evaluation, but argued that Defendant had not shown anger towards his
sister or his present girlfriend. R107:l-3. The trial court responded: "Based on his
history, they are probably the next to get hit/ 7

Id. at 3.

The court recited

Defendant's criminal record and then summarized: "This is a picture of a man who
doesn't follow the law, who ignores court orders and who is a big strong bully and
does, you know, I guess maybe we could say no impulse control which makes him a
dangerous person, and that's a concern." Id. at 4. The court repeatedly expressed its
concerns about Defendant's dangerousness throughout the remainder of the
proceeding:
•

Speaking to Defendant: "My worry is if I give you a chance
and put you on probation somebody else is going to get hurt.
M a t 4-5.

•

Responding to defense counsel's minimizing Defendant's
verbal wrangling with the court: "But even here in Court in
response to me, he's raising his voice. He's aggressively
defensive and he's shaking his head again now. Everything
I'm seeing says this guy's never going to learn." Id. at 7.

9

•

Commenting after reading aloud part of Mr. Zimmer's
Evaluative Summary: "People aren't safe around you,
Mr. Brown, that's our problem. Id. at 8.

The Restitution Hearing
At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor stated that the incident leading to
the charges constituted domestic violence, "since the Defendant and victim were cohabitants." Rl 07:12. The prosecutor further stated that Cheree had relocated about
seven months after the incident "out of fear that the Defendant would retaliate or
come back again after he got out of custody." Id. The prosecutor reported that the
Office of Crime Victims Reparations (OCVR) had reimbursed Cheree $1,300 for rent
and $500 for a deposit. Id. The prosecutor argued that because Defendant "caused
the victim to lose ... her feeling of safety[,]... it seems reasonable that her choice to
relocate should be something that would be reimbursed by him, especially since this
was a case where the crime occurred in the residence where he had formerly lived
and he would know where to find her again and it was a crime of violence." Id. at
13.
Defendant objected, first on the ground that the State's request for restitution
was filed more than 180 days after sentencing. Id. at 13. He further objected to an
award to restitution for rent because he had not agreed to pay those costs, nor had
he admitted or pleaded guilty to criminal conduct that related to those costs. Id. at
13-14.
10

The trial court recognized that the commitment limited the filing of the
restitution request to 180 days and that overly extending the request for restitution
was ''not fair to the defendant/7 Id. at 15. "At the same time/' the court observed, "I
feel this has been [an] absolutely, entirely appropriate area for restitution/' Id. In
accord with the OCVR notices, the court ordered Defendant to pay restitution:
$180.98 to Spring Weatherspoon for her medical expenses; $989.74 to Cheree
Weatherspoon for her medical expenses and $1,800 for rent and rent deposit. Id. at
14-16; see R65-68. The trial court attributed the OCVR's compensation to Cheree for
rent deposit to the probable loss of deposit resulting from Defendant's kicking in the
door of the victims' home. R107:16. The OCVR notice states that on August 1,2007,
Cheree was compensated for $650 in rent and $500 in rent deposit, and that on
September 1, 2007, Cheree was compensated for $650 in rent. R66.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
L
The state concedes that the judgment incorrectly reflects that Defendant
pleaded guilty to burglary. The record shows that Defendant pled guilty to
burglary, a second degree felony, and not to aggravated burglary. After a proper
plea colloquy and without objection from the State, the trial court accepted
Defendant's guilty plea to burglary. The case should be remanded for correction of
the judgment.
11

II.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to pay
restitution for the victim's relocation costs.
Defendant is a 245-pound man with a substantial criminal history of assaults
and domestic abuse and has, according to the presentence investigator and the
diagnostic evaluators, a propensity for violence with little insight into his problems
in managing his anger. He entered the home of his ex-girlfriend in contravention of
a no contact order, beat her, and threatened her to kill her. He pleaded guilty to
burglary, admitting that he entered the dwelling with intent to assault, and
although the aggravated assault conviction reflects his striking the victim's mother,
the record shows that he entered intending to assault the victim.
Under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, a crime victim is entitled to
restitution consisting of pecuniary damages caused by a defendant's criminal
activity. Contrary to Defendant's arguments, the victim's relocation costs were a
direct result of his criminal activity. The victim moved out of fear of Defendant's
retaliating and as soon as the possibility arose that he might be placed on probation.
The costs of her relocating -two months rent and deposit for her new residence —
were reasonable and equitable. And in accord with the Act and this Court's case
law, those costs were allowable pecuniary damages — economic harm in clearly

12

ascertainable dollar amounts related to Defendant's criminal activity— even though
they stemmed from a mental injury — the victim's fear of Defendant.
ARGUMENT
L
THE STATE CONCEDES THAT THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
CORRECTED TO REFLECT THAT DEFENDANT PLEADED
GUILTY TO BURGLARY
Defendant correctly claims that the judgment incorrectly states that he was
convicted of aggravated burglary when, in fact, he entered a guilty plea to simple
burglary. Aplt. Br. at 6-9.
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony. Rl.
On March 12, 2007, Defendant entered a guilty plea to "Burglary/' evidenced by
Defendant's plea statement (Addendum B). R26. The plea statement expressly
states that the degree of offense is "2° felony/' for which the punishment is "1-15 yrs.
U.S.P." Id. At the very outset of the change-of-plea hearing and in response to the
trial court's inquiry as to the status of the case, defense counsel informed the court
that "what's proposed is that Count I would be amended to reflect burglary, striking
the aggravated portion." R126:2. Thereafter, without objection by the State and
after a proper colloquy, the trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea to burglary:
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Brown, how do you plead to the charge of
burglary, a second-degree felony?
MR. BROWN: Guilty.
13

THE COURT: I'll accept your guilty pleas and enter your convictions . . . .
R126:5.
In spite of the clear record of defendant's plea to burglary, all of the court's
proceedings thereafter, including the judgment, incorrectly recite the Count I charge
as "aggravated burglary (amended) - 2nd degree felony." R36,37,39,51,53,57,87,
88„ 89,108,110, 111, 112. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the trial
court for the entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that, as to Count I, defendant
was convicted of burglary, and not aggravated burglary. See Rule 30(b), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure ("Clerical mistakes in judgments . . . may be corrected by the
court at any time").
IL
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION FOR THE
VICTIM'S RELOCATION COSTS
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly ordered defendant to pay
Cheree Weatherspoon's relocation expenses . Aplt. Br. at 10-24. He does not
challenge restitution ordered for Cheree's and her mother, Spring's, medical
expenses. Rather, he argues that (1) the court improperly awarded restitution where
Defendant "did not agree to pay, did not admit responsibility for, and was not
convicted of conduct relating to relocation expenses" (Aplt. Br. at 15,15-19, 22-24);
14

and; (2) the record fails to support the relocation costs (Aplt Br. at 19-21). The State
acknowledges that Defendant did not agree to pay for the Cheree's relocation
expenses. The claim nevertheless fails. The record supports that the Cheree's
relocation expenses constitute proper pecuniary damages following Defendant's
civil battery and assault on her, civil actions that arise from defendant's admitted
criminal activity.
A, The Crime Victims Restitution Act provides that victims be
compensated for all losses caused by criminal activity,
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
c h a p t e r . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(l) (West Supp. 2008). See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-38a~101 (West Supp. 2008) (identifying chapter 38a of the Code as the
"Crime Victims Restitution Act") ("the Act").
"'Criminal activities' means any offense of which the defendant is convicted
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(2) (West Supp. 2008).
"'Restitution' means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages
to a victim . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(ll) (West Supp. 2008).

15

Defendant pled guilty to burglary and aggravated assault. R26-33. In so
pleading, Defendant admitted that, as to burglary, [he] entered or remained
unlawfully in the dwelling of [Cheree Weatherspoon] with intent to commit
assault." R27. He also admitted that, as to aggravated assault, "[he] threatened
with the use of unlawful force causing bodily injury to [Spring Weatherspoon]/' Id.
The factual basis for the pleas was that he "entered the home of his girlfriend
[Cheree] without permission and got in a fight with her mother, Spring
Weatherspoon, who received a cut to her hand." Id. Defendant admitted that he
entered Cheree's home because he was upset with her: "The reason this all
happened was because I was coming to her house off of work and I had seen a black
guy parking outside of the house and I thought that she was seeing him steady me
[sic] trying to talk to her I just started yelling and one thing led to another . . . ."
PSI:3. That Defendant also struck Cheree in the face, beat her, and threatened to kill
her, and that Cheree and Spring were transported to a hospital for their injuries, is
undisputed. R3-4; PSI:3. Nor does defendant dispute that Cheree relocated "out of
fear that the [Defendant would retaliate or come back again after he got out of
custody." R107:12.

16

B.

Defendant's violent conduct gave rise to civil actions for battery
and assault.
Given the foregoing undisputed facts and admissions, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to pay restitution—Cheree's "full
pecuniary damages'" in having to relocate following Defendant's burglary and
aggravated assault.
"'Pecuniary damages' means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities . . . but excludes . ..
pain and suffering." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(6) (West Supp. 2008).
As a result of his admissions and his undisputed criminal conduct, Defendant
was subject to civil actions for both battery and assault.
"A battery is an act ' ( a ) . . . intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact
with the person of the other . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact'
from which '(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly
results/" Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 503 n.3 (Utah 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 13 (1965)).

Defendant was subject to an action for civil battery. He admitted entering
Cheree's residence with intent to assault R27. His intent to assault was directed at
Cheree: he admitted that he entered because he feared she was seeing another man.

17

PSI:3. Defendant does not dispute that he struck Cheree in the face, that he beat her,
and that she went to the hospital for treatment of her injuries. R3-4.
Defendant was also subject to an action for civil assault.
" An assault is an act ' ( a ) . . . intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact
with the person of the other . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact' by
which ' ( b ) . . . the other is . . . put in such imminent apprehension/" Tiede, 915 P.2d
at 503 n.3 (Utah 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965)).
Defendant does not dispute that in the course of his battery he threatened to
killCherree. R3-4.
In sum, the record supports that Defendant was subject to civil actions for
both battery and assault.
C.

The victim was entitled to receive pecuniary damages consisting
of her relocation costs stemming from her fear of Defendant.
Defendant does not appear to dispute the availability of these civil actions.

Aplt. Br. at 15-19. Rather, he argues that the record supporting these actions does
not justify the recovery of pecuniary damages consisting of Cheree's relocation
costs, because those costs are both causally unrelated to and temporally remote from
his admitted criminal conduct. Aplt. Br. at 15-19. Specifically, Defendant argues
that because he was convicted of burglary and aggravated assault, he could be
ordered to pay for only "property damaged or destroyed, medical or professional
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services or care, therapy and rehabilitation, and lost income or wages 'clearly
resulting 7 from those crimes/' Aplt. Br. at 17-18, 20 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 7738a-302(5)(b) (West Supp. 2008)). He also argues that the relocation expenses, which
''purportedly arose on August 1 and September 1, several months after [his] conduct
in this c a s e . . . are not related to the conduct for which [he] admitted responsibility.
. . . " Id. Defendant construes the law too narrowly.
Contrary to Defendant's argument, section 77-38a-302(5)(b), does not limit
compensation to the crime victim to the items Defendant identifies or to the brief
time period following the incident that Defendant implicitly suggests. Rather, the
section provides that "[i]n determining the monetary sum and other conditions for
complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including [those statutory
items listed by Defendant]." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(5)(b) (WestSupp. 2008))
(emphasis added). Further, "[i]n determining restitution, the court shall determine
complete restitution" — "the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses
caused by defendant." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008))
(emphasis added).

And "pecuniary damages" expressly includes those costs,

"whether or not yet incurred," as long as they stem from the offender's criminal
activity. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(6). Thus, except as otherwise stated in law,
restitution reaches as far as a criminal's activity affects his victim in time and
material impact.
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"To the extent possible, the fundamental purpose of compensatory damages
is to place the plaintiff in the same position he would have occupied had the tort not
been committed/' Avis Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc.
2005 UT App 326, ^ 31 n.4,121 P.3d 24 (reviewing proper measure of damages in
conversion action) (citation omitted), affd, 2006 UT 45,143 P.3d. 278, reh'g denied.
While Utah's appellate courts have not considered a challenge to restitution for
relocation costs, other jurisdictions have and concluded that such costs are within
restitution's proper scope.
In People v. Meams, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), Mearns hid in
the victim's mobile home and then raped her at knifepoint when she returned. Id. at
513. Before he left, he told the victim that he knew where her son went to school
and that he would hurt the boy if she talked about his raping her. Id. Mearns was
arrested about three months after the offense. Id. Out of "constant fear of being
assaulted again" and "fear of her son's safety," the victim sold her mobile home for
$13,000 and purchased another for $26,575, sometime after Mearns was arrested. Id.
at 514. The trial court found that it was reasonable under the circumstances for the
victim to relocate. Id. at 517. The court awarded the victim $13,575 in restitution,
the difference between the sale of the victim's original mobile home and the
purchase price of the new mobile home, noting that "[t]he intent of the Legislature
is to really make a victim as whole as one can do so in a monetary way . . . ." Id.
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The California Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court. As in Utah, the
statute in California provides that "'a victim of crime who incurs any economic loss
as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from any
defendant convicted of that crime.'" Id. at 514 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4
(a)(1)). Additionally, unlike any Utah provision, section 1202.4 explicitly authorizes
restitution for "'[ejxpenses incurred by an adult victim in relocating away from the
defendant/"

Id. (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4 (f)(3)(I)). Based on these

provisions, the appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling, holding that it was
"rational, well-reasoned, based on factual evidence presented at the hearing, and
within its broad discretion/7 Id. at 517. But the appellate court's decision was not
based exclusively on the statutory provision for relocation costs: "[P]utting aside
the specific wording in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I), the trial court reasonably
could have concluded that the increased cost incurred in the [victim's] move was an
'economic loss' within the general language of the first sentence of section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)[ — restitution is to be awarded for economic loss "as a result of the
defendant's conduct."] Id.4 The court reasoned:

4

The first sentence of subsection (f) provides: "In every case in which a
victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court
shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an
amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the
victim . . . . " Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4 (f).
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[The victim] moved in order to prevent defendant from finding her
again and reduce the fears engendered by the very mobilehome
[sic]where she was sexually assaulted at knifepoint. The trial court
could reasonably conclude that the enormous emotional trauma
resulting from the attack was such that Susan F. virtually had to move
and this was an "economic loss" resulting from defendant's conduct
without relying on the more specific language in section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3)(I). No abuse of discretion occurred.
Id. at 518.
Presented with similar circumstances, other courts have reached the same
conclusion as in Mearns. In Santiago v. State, 669 So. 2d 334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(per curiam), the victim, Santiago's daughter, argued with her mother, who hit the
victim with a log and tried to grab the victim's four-year-old daughter. Id. at 335.
Santiago was convicted of battery. Id. At the restitution hearing, the "emotionally
distraught" victim testified that she incurred travel expenses removing her daughter
from the state because she was afraid her mother would return and kidnap the
child. Id. The court ordered Santiago to pay restitution to the victim for her travel
expenses in safekeeping the child. Id. The Florida District Court of Appeals upheld
the restitution order, concluding that the victim "clearly" suffered a financial loss
"directly and significantly related to the crimes proved at trial." Id. See also State v.
Brady, 819 P.2d 1033, 1033 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding sexual assault victim's
moving expenses were "economic loss," and therefore moving expenses could be
subject of restitution order where victim moved out of apartment where assault had
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taken place because she feared that the defendant might return and do her further
harm).
This Court should reach the same conclusion as in Mearns, Santiago, and
Brady. Here, defendant entered Cheree's residence without permission, in violation
of a no contact order, and then broke down a door, violently battered Cheree and
her mother, and later threatened to kill Cheree. R3-4, 27. The prosecutor stated,
without objection, that Cheree had relocated "out of fear that the Defendant would
retaliate or come back again after he got out of custody/' R107:12. See State v. Hight,
Jr., 2008 UT App 118, f 6,182 P.3d 922 (upholding restitution award where victim's
testimony was unopposed and no record evidence showed that victim's testimony
was so lacking that "no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court"). Also undisputed is that the "verified expenses incurred by the victim[,
Cheree Weatherspoon]" were $1,300 for two successive months' rent and $500 in
rent deposit. R65-66.
The trial court agreed that restitution for Cheree's relocation costs were
reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted Defendant's criminal record
of domestic abuse and assaults, his propensity for violence, and the court's concern
about the danger Defendant presented to the community and the victim. R107:3-5,
7-8. The observations of the AP&P investigator and the diagnostic evaluators
concerning Defendant's difficulties managing anger, his propensity for violence,
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and his lack of insight into his behavior, see PSL2, 4; DEV/G4-5; DEV/Z:3-5,
support the trial court's ruling that Cheree's relocation costs were justified. R107:15.
This Court should uphold that conclusion.
D. Defendant's arguments that the relocation costs were unrelated to
his conduct, unsupported by the record, and amounted to "pain
and suffering" are unsupported in fact and law.
Defendant challenges the restitution award on several grounds, each of which
is meritless.
1.

The relocation costs were directly related to defendant's conduct.
Defendant argues that the relocation costs "are not related to conduct for

which [he] admitted responsibility," because they "purportedly arose on August 1
and September 1, several months after the conduct in this case." Aplt. Br. at 17,18.
However, Defendant was arrested on and booked into jail on January 25,2007, only
two days after the incident, and he remained in custody until sentencing, on August
24,2007, after which he was placed on probation and released from custody. Rl, 3940, 56; 58-59, DEV/Z:1. Therefore, Cheree had no reason to move before August.
See Mearns, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 518 (holding that even though victim moved months
after her assailant arrested, trial court not compelled to conclude that victim moved
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for some reason other than her fear of "being assaulted again").5 Indeed, the timing
of Cheree's relocating—she moved as soon as Defendant might be released—shows
that Defendant's conduct directly led to her move.
2.

The court properly referred to the OCVR's notice to assist it in
determining restitution.
Defendant also argues that "the record fails to support the relocation costs"

on three grounds Aplt. Br. at 19-21. He first argues that the trial court, in
contravention of UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-403 (West 2004), improperly considered
the Restitution/Subrogation Notice (attached at Addendum C), attached to the
State's proposed order for restitution, which detailed the rental and deposit costs for
which Cheree was reimbursed by the OCVR. Aplt. Br. at 19-20.
First, because that argument was not preserved in the trial court and
defendant has not argued plain error on appeal, the Court should decline to
consider it. See e.g., State v. Person, 2006 UT App 288, \ 10,140 P.3d 584 (declining to
consider unpreserved claim where neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances
were argued on appeal). In any case, Defendant's interpretation is mistaken.

5

Defendant also argues that his attack was not the cause of Cheree's moving
because at the restitution hearing the prosecutor said that Cheree's decision to move
was a "choice." Aplt. Br. at 17 (citing R107:13). Defendant takes out of context, and
thereby mischaracterizes, the prosecutor's use of the word "choice " to describe
Cheree's decision to relocate. The prosecutor had, a moment earlier, specifically
argued that "[Cheree] relocated out of fear that the Defendant would retaliate or
come back again after he got out of custody." R107:12.
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Section 63-25a-403 provides that "[t]he court shall not consider a reparations
award when determining the order of restitution

" UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-

403 (2) (West 2004). Defendant apparently interprets this provision to literally mean
that the court shall not even look at or be aware of the contents of a reparations
notice.
Contrary to Defendant's interpretation, the statutory term, "not consider/' is
not intended to so constrain the sentencing court's access to resources. Rather, the
term is intended as notice to the court that its discretion in awarding restitution is
not to be limited by a reparations award, for at least two reasons. First, the Crime
Victims Reparation Act (CVRA) defines a different scope of recovery for
compensable expenses, whereas the Crime Victim's Restitution Act does not.
Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-411 (3) (d), -(g), -(6) (West 2004) (limiting
reparations award to 66 2 / 3 % of loss of wages and support of dependents, and to a
maximum total of $25,000) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302 (2)(a) (West Supp.
2008) (providing for "complete restitution" of "all losses caused by the defendant").
See e.g., State v. Dendy, 520 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App. 1994) (recognizing that
reparations under the statute were limited because provided by public revenues,
whereas restitution, which reached a broader set of damages, was not).
Notice to the sentencing court that reparations and restitution should be
treated differently is made express by the subsection immediately preceding that
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which Defendant relies on: " A reparations award shall not supplant restitution as
established under Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act...." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-25a-403 (1) (West 2004). And newly amended section 63-25a-403(2)
further clarifies that the section is not meant to deny the sentencing court access to
relevant resources, but rather to advise the court that its discretion is not to be
limited by a reparations award. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-503 (2) (West Supp.
2008) (//rThe court may not reduce an order of restitution based on a reparations
award/')
Second, the nature of the discretion applied to reparations and restitution is
different.

Reparations awards are processed by hearing officers, hired by the

director of the OCVR. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-, 407(1), -408(5) (West 2004).
Restitution is ordered by a judge, appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the
Senate. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 8.
In short, section 63-25a-403 (2) does not preclude a sentencing court from
using a Restitution/Subrogation Notice to assist it in determining a restitution
order. Here, the State was satisfied that the notice constituted a satisfactory
accounting of the victim's pecuniary losses, and the court accepted it as such,
without objection.
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3.

The record supports that the rent deposit was related to rental of a
new and different residence and that restitution for two months
rent was reasonable and equitable.
Defendant also argues that the record does not support the court's order for

restitution for the rent deposit. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. An alternative ground supports
the award. "[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its
ruling . . . , was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on
by the lower court/" State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 19,147 P.3d 448 (quoting Bailey
v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Mai court assumed that reparations for the rent deposit were based
on Cheree's "probably los[ing] the deposit because [Defendant] kicked in the door."
R107:16. Defendant rightly attacks that assumption as unsupported by the record.
However, the Restitution/Subrogation Notice refers to "rent deposit/' not in
relation to Cheree's former residence, but to her new residence. The notice makes
no mention of a deposit paid to the lessor or owner of the residence where Cheree
Weatherspoon was attacked. Instead, it states that on August 1,2007, $650.00 was
paid for rent on the "Anderson Property" and that on the same date, $500.00 was
paid for a rent deposit on the same property. R66 (Addendum C). In short, the
record indicates that the "verified expenses or losses incurred by the victim" —
28

Cheree's rent deposit—relate not to her former residence, but to a new, different
residence.
Defendant's third ground of objection to the record is that the award for rent
is arbitrary in its length- two months as opposed to some other period. Aplt. Br. at
21.
"'[T]he measure of damages is flexible, allowing trial courts to fashion an
equitable award to the victim/" Right, Jr., 2008 UT App 118,1 3 (quoting State v.
Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, | 14, 82 P.3d 211). Having implicitly accepted the
prosecutor's representation that Cheree relocated out of fear of Defendant's
retaliation, fully justified by Defendant's undisputed propensity for uncontrollable
violence, the court ordered Defendant to pay two months rent: "I feel this has been
[an] absolutely, entirely appropriate area for restitution." R107:15. The award for
two months rent, a period in which the victim might well continue to fear
Defendant, wras exceedingly modest and equitable.
In the same vein, Defendant argues that "the record fails to support that
Cheree would not have paid rent in August and September, but for Brown's conduct
in January." Aplt. Br. at 21 (emphasis in original). The record supports precisely
the opposite. It is undisputed that Cheree lived with her mother in her mother's
residence. R3. By relocating, Cheree incurred an expense she had not earlier had.
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In sum, the record fully supports the court's order that Defendant pay
restitution for Cheree's relocation expenses.
4.

The Crime Victims Restitution Act expressly provides for damages
for actual economic harm even if they stem from mental injury
caused by criminal activity.
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in accepting the

prosecutor's assertion that "restitution for relocation costs would compensate the
victim for fear and loss of safety." Aplt. Br. at 22. "Damages for these purposes," he
argues, "may be more properly classified as emotional harm or damages for pain
and suffering" and "are not recoverable in restitution."

Id. This argument

mistakenly conflates the imprecise damages of emotional injury, which are
admittedly not compensable in restitution, with the strictly pecuniary damages
which may flow from emotional injury, but which are compensable in restitution.
As stated, if "complete restitution" is ordered, as in this case, "the court shall
order that the defendant make restitution" — that "necessary to compensate a victim
for all losses caused by the defendant. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(l), -(2) (West
Supp. 2008). Restitution, however, is limited to "pecuniary damages." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-38a-102(ll) (West Supp. 2008). And "pecuniary damages" are "all
demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, which a person could
recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities ... but excludes... pain and suffering." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a~
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102(6) (West Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, the Crime Victims Restitution
Act, expressly distinguishes damages constituting "demonstrable economic injury/'
which are recoverable in restitution, from damages constituting "pain and
suffering/' which are not.
In an opinion that led to the enactment of current section 77-38a-102(6), this
Court made still clearer the effect this distinction has on the ordering of restitution.
Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, f f 28 (Greenwood, J., concurring, joined by Orme J.) In
Corbitt, a majority of the Court discussed former section 77-38a-102(6)'s anomalous
use of the terms "special damages" and "general damages" to denote what damages
were compensable in restitution. Id. at f f 18-28. Judge Greenwood clarified that
the Legislature's undoubted intention was "to exclude from the scope of restitution"
the "less tangible elements of damage" like "pain and suffering" or "emotional
harm." Id. at f 27. "In the case of certain dignitary invasions, such as ... assaults,.
.. the injury done is often not an economic one at all...,"

and "'general damages/

[normally recoverable in such a case,] does not refer to a measure [of damages] at
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all." Id. (emphasis added).6 These damages, however, are " distinguish [able] from
[damages following] proof of actual economic harm, . . . the actual amount of
money that should be awarded/ 7 Id. The Legislature's adoption of the Court's
equating " demonstrable pecuniary loss" with "actual pecuniary harm," see id. at \
28, indicates that the Legislature approved of the distinctions made in Corbitt.
Indeed, the Act implicitly announces this policy by authorizing restitution for the
"cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to.
.. mental health care . . . . " See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(ii) (West Supp.
2008). See State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, 13 n.5,170 P.3d 1141 (Utah App. 2007)
(implicitly distinguishing damages for "pain and suffering" from "economic losses"
stemming from same injury in explaining scope of Utah's no-fault insurance
statutes) (citation omitted); Brady, 819 P.2d at 1033 ("If the cost of psychological
counseling for the victim of a violent crime is directly attributable to the crime, so
are moving expenses incurred in an effort to restore the victim's equanimity."); State
6

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. c (1965) ("The principal
element of damages in actions for battery [and] assault . . . is frequently the
disagreeable emotion experienced by the plaintiff."); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 9 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds. 1984) (" [T]he establishment of the tort
cause of action [of battery] entitles the plaintiff also to compensation for the
resulting mental disturbance, such as fright. . . ."); id. at § 10 ("Since assault, as
distinguished from battery, is essentially a mental rather than a physical invasion, it
follows that the damages recoverable for it are those for the plaintiffs mental
disturbance, including fright .. . .").
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v. Behnke, 553 N.W.2d 265, 272-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding restitution for
purchase of dead bolt "to help [victim] feel safe after Behnke's attack" and holding
that while "general damages" for "pain and suffering" were unavailable under
restitution statute, "any specific expenditure paid out because of the crime . . . is
appropriate) (citation omitted); State v. Fleming, 480 A.2d 107,110-11 (N.H. 1984)
(citations omitted) (observing that definition of "economic loss" is limited by phrase
"pecuniary detriment;" therefore, only losses easily ascertained and measured, i.e.,
only liquidated amounts, should be recoverable under statute; hospital bills, value
of property, and lost employment income resulting from offender's criminal acts are
easily ascertainable; damages for pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, and
wrongful death, as contemplated by statute, are not) (citations omitted).
In short, the Act contemplates that restitution shall be ordered for those
clearly ascertainable economic losses that can be denominated in dollar amounts,
even though they might flow from emotional injury. Cases cited by defendant, see
Aplt. Br. at 19, 22, have declined to acknowledge that distinction.
Here, the prosecution did not request and the trial court did not order that
Defendant pay restitution for either emotional injury or pain and suffering. Rather,
the court ordered restitution only for Cheree's pecuniary damages — those precisely
denominated relocation costs resulting from what she could have recovered in a
civil action for battery or assault, in the amount of $1,800.
33

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on
restitution, but remand the case to correct the judgment to show that Defendant was
convicted of burglary.
«
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Addendum A

§ 63-25a-403 (West 2004). Restitution-Reparations not to
supplant restitution— Assignment of claim for restitution judgment to Reparations
Office

UTAH CODE ANN.

(1) A reparations award shall not supplant restitution as established under Title 77,
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act, or as established by any other provisions.
(2) The court shall not consider a reparations award when determining the order of
restitution nor when enforcing restitution.
(3) If, due to reparation payments to a victim, the Reparations Office is assigned under
Section 63-25a-419 a claim for the victim's judgment for restitution or a portion of the
restitution, the Reparations Office may file with the sentencing court a notice of the
assignment. The notice of assignment shall be signed by the victim and a Reparations
Officer and shall state the amount of the claim assigned.
(4) Upon conviction and sentencing of the defendant, the court shall enter a civil
judgment for complete restitution as provided in Section 77-38a-401 and identify the
Reparations Office as the assignee of the assigned portion of the judgment.
(5) If the notice of assignment is filed after sentencing, the court shall modify the civil
judgment for restitution to identify the Reparations Office as the assignee of the assigned
portion of the judgment.
Laws 1986, c. 150, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 46, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 72, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 242,
§ 34, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2000, c. 235, § 2, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 2,
eff. May 6, 2002.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-25a-408 (West 2004). Reparations officers

The reparations officers shall in addition to any assignments made by the director of the
Reparations Office:
(1) hear and determine all matters relating to claims for reparations and reinvestigate or
reopen claims without regard to statutes of limitation or periods of prescription;
(2) obtain from prosecuting attorneys, law enforcement officers, and other criminal
justice agencies, investigations and data to enable the reparations officer to determine
whether and to what extent a claimant qualifies for reparations;
(3) hold hearings, administer oaths or affirmations, examine any person under oath or
affirmation, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and giving of testimony of
witnesses, require the production of any books, papers, documents, or other evidence
which may contribute to the reparations officer's ability to determine particular reparation
awards;

(4) determine who is a victim or dependent;
(5) award reparations or other benefits determined to be due under this chapter and the
rules of the board;
(6) take notice of judicially recognized facts and general, technical, and scientific facts
within their specialized knowledge;
(7) advise and assist the board in developing policies recognizing the rights, needs, and
interests of crime victims;
(8) render periodic reports as requested by the board concerning:
(a) the officers' activities; and
(b) the manner in which the rights, needs, and interests of crime victims are being
addressed by the state's criminal justice system;
(9) establish priorities for assisting elderly victims of crime or those victims
facing extraordinary hardships;
(10) cooperate with the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to develop
information regarding crime victims' problems and programs; and
(11) assist the director in publicizing the provisions of the Crime Victims' Reparations
Act, [FN1] including the procedures for obtaining reparation, and in encouraging law
enforcement agencies, health providers, and other related officials to take reasonable care
to ensure that victims are informed about the provisions of this chapter and the procedure
for applying for reparation.
Laws 1986, c. 150, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 84, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 72, § 5; Laws 1996, c. 242,
§39,eff. April 29, 1996.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-25a-411 (West 2004). Compensable losses and amounts

A reparations award under this chapter may be made if:
(1) the reparations officer finds the claim satisfies the requirements for the award under
the provisions of this chapter and the rules of the board;
(2) monies are available in the fund;

(3) the person for whom the award of reparations is to be paid is otherwise eligible under
this act;
(4) the claim is for an allowable expense incurred by the victim, as follows:
(a) reasonable and necessary charges incurred for products, services, and
accommodations;
(b) inpatient and outpatient medical treatment and physical therapy, subject to
rules promulgated by the board pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act;
(c) mental health counseling which:
(i) is set forth in a mental health treatment plan which has been approved
prior to any payment by a reparations officer; and
(ii) qualifies within any further rules promulgated by the board pursuant to
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act;
(d) actual loss of past earnings and anticipated loss of future earnings because of a
death or disability resulting from the personal injury at a rate not to exceed 662/3% of the person's weekly gross salary or wages or the maximum amount
allowed under the state workers' compensation statute;
(e) care of minor children enabling a victim or spouse of a victim, but not both of
them, to continue gainful employment at a rate per child per week as determined
under rules established by the board;
(f) funeral and burial expenses for death caused by the criminally injurious
conduct, subject to rules promulgated by the board pursuant to Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act;
(g) loss of support to the dependent or dependents not otherwise compensated for
a pecuniary loss for personal injury, for as long as the dependence would have
existed had the victim survived, at a rate not to exceed 66-2/3% of the person's
weekly salary or wages or the maximum amount allowed under the state workers'
compensation statute, whichever is less;
(h) personal property necessary and essential to the health or safety of the victim
as defined by rules promulgated by the board pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a,
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act; and
(i) medical examinations as defined in Section 63-25a-402, subject to rules
promulgated by the board pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah

Administrative Rulemaking Act, which may allow for exemptions from
Sections 63-25a-409, 63-25a-412, and 63-25a-413.
(5) If a Utah resident suffers injury or death as a result of criminally injurious conduct
inflicted in a state, territory, or country that does not provide a reciprocal crime victims'
compensation program, the Utah resident has the same rights under this chapter as if the
injurious conduct occurred in this state.
(6) An award of reparations shall not exceed $25,000 in the aggregate unless the victim is
entitled to proceeds in excess of that amount as provided in Subsection 77-38a-403(2).
However, reparations for actual medical expenses incurred as a result of homicide,
attempted homicide, aggravated assault, or DUI offenses, may be awarded up to $50,000
in the aggregate.
Laws 1993, c. 72. § 8; Laws 1995, c. 75, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 242, § 42,
eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 308, § 13, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 235, § 7,
eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 3, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, c. 256, § 51, eff.
July 1,2002.

§ 63M-7-503 (West Supp. 2008). Restitution-Reparations not to
supplant restitution— Assignment of claim for restitution judgment to Reparations
Office

UTAH CODE ANN.

(1) A reparations award may not supplant restitution as established under Title 77,
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act, or as established by any other provisions.
(2) The court may not reduce an order of restitution based on a reparations award.
(3) If, due to reparation payments to a victim, the Office of Crime Victim Reparations is
assigned under Section 63M-7-519 a claim for the victim's judgment for restitution or a
portion of the restitution, the office may file with the sentencing court a notice of the
assignment. The notice of assignment shall be signed by the victim and a reparations
officer and shall state the amount of the claim assigned.
(4) Upon conviction and sentencing of the defendant, the court shall enter a civil
judgment for complete restitution as provided in Section 77-38a-401 and identify the
office as the assignee of the assigned portion of the judgment.
(5) If the notice of assignment is filed after sentencing, the court shall modify the civil
judgment for restitution to identify the office as the assignee of the assigned portion of
the judgment.
Laws 2008, c. 339, § 7, eff. July 1, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1967, eff. May 5, 2008.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-38a-101 (West 2004). Title

This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act."
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-38a-102 (West Supp. 2008). Definitions

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Conviction" includes a:
(a) judgment of guilt;
(b) a plea of guilty; or
(c) a plea of no contest.
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution.
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost
earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain
and suffering.
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the
defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on

condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance
agreement.
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which,
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where
charges are dismissed without a plea.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further
defined by law.
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money:
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an
offender; and
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except
that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice,
or a bounty hunter.
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the
public.
(13) "Screening* means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has
been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003;
Laws 2005, c. 96, § 3, eff. May 2, 2005.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2008). Restitution criteria

(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-3 8a-102(14)
and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for
all losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the
time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part,
the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution,
the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the
court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and
treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law
of the place of treatment;

(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted
in bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due
to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by
the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the
offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the
death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution
inappropriate.
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the
time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an
order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 2002;
Laws 2002, c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003;
Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005.

Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. ERRORS AND DEFECTS
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights
of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and
after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
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Addendum B

IN TBDE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FILES

r'fT^fTrc^etT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff, S A A L ^ COLMV
By l^CC£l_.
fJ-'nuty

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
ClerK

Case No. 0 1 1 ^ 0 7 7j F3

vs.

Arnrttrl UiAnnzfl Browr).
Defendant

I, ArmQKYl U M M T J Q 6rOWn. hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understandtihefollowing facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (o^te-eeetest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision
A.

B.

PwnlQjrv

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

TMm y

(Xrjjmiltri /w=/iu L

C.

Qjrfharnp
T

D.

c

M\t aorees to ditmi5e> COUnb H ^

and Ca^ *0Tiqo07to^5

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (ef-so contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (er no contest) are:

(A)Te rlefrnflflnf m\nrd or mncnn^ (iniri\\)-piiK/ m ^he dvMHUm
r£ mrtVrr

yvHh w\ftr\i \r> rnmmit

Qtt)U\t

ffhSft drihvlanr ihrenimed wifh ^e d Mfth\\jfiiJ -force Onittm
jfwiiKi \n\\im
rtlrr.
todily
injurytoton nam\xr

^L

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading uo luulesL, 1 am uul wntesto-g that I-e-eaartted-^fat
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (OF, if I am pleading no contest, I do net-dispute or
costes$}-that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally Hable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(oj^Bbe-contrst) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (OFno contest):~
(\\ gftO,3) Souih Adams ^ i w i , in f> 1 A t IHTIA cm or atmt

I7i n nnry ??> 3rtff7 /frmrt/ttl l ^ n y f l

ftrrmin

fhfrreri

fhr

W I T C4 h)4 niYlfrienri iAiilhm/f npfmiss)/rr> fl/ori art- m a
flnhf

Writ) haf mftilyr QpnrxQ W ^ h ^ p O f l t o

o ^ i i f f) her Vkirvi

'

^ r p r a i f f l

o

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I imderstand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (opae-eostest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand
2

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's sendee to me.
I mave no$) (hsvc) waived my right to counsel. If I have waive d-my right to counsel!
• I KSyggeae so knowingly, mLclligendy, and voluntarily for the following leasuns:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I cgj^Fy^that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements ofjhe<E^ges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also undei^tsfa my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty-(f)fno contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is \JhY)ifr]\l lApIfifk
.
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (G^^axrcc^st) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (e¥3»©s«©stes£)..
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would
pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. 1 know that if I do not plead guilty
(orae-contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each
3

element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (ax^e^aoateg^ I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (oj^8=ea^gi). I understand that if I wish
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (cn=-^-€:B:ntE5T) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (op^re=e©©test). LfaTOWttarty^
coB£dst)4Q.~ajC3iii^
subjeUiutHBayself to sening
r
a masrdeteiy-peBalfy^eF-^
I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any \ictim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same tune (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or wrhich I have plead guilty (ofcao
CQgfest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

4

Plea agreement. My guilty (o^^^^^^est^t) plea(s^is/are^is/are not) the result of
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorneyT^ll the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:

->e pay am

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (6£*e«^8fe£t). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or ddttt anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am '2h years of age. I have attended school through the V 1/ grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I wras not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea, I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

5

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (of^afesw^^t) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understandthat for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to witlidiawfrom the plea agreement uiust'be
marip wifbi" <^il^>yf^»rjilfv^ilhiu ^nlliy m inr^H^gf I w ni only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Dated this i Z r day of

[VlfWll

. 200J.
OMMJX^J Qi«
DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for k\r\Qfd
U\mmO fomWn . the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

/I;
ATTORNEY $OR DEFENDANT
Bar No. f ^

6

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
, defendant I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

BarNo.^g^O

7

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

Form revised 6/25/03

(L day of

{MH-^
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State of Utah
OFJ-1CE OF CRIME VICTIM REPARATIONS
JONM. HUNTSMAN, X*

RON/ U> U. QOPPQN, JBDtnek ", CKA

CrOWJTWr

OAKYILHBK3EfcT

Restitution/
,
„
.
Subrogation Notice

BROOKE ST JOHN
FAX: 412-3601

7 ?

September 11, 2007
Suspects:
Brown. Am ?wd Kwanr-a
Date of Crime;
0117 3/2007
Type of Crime- ——Asss ttW^rrr--^.
Victim:
^heree We*i ^JhstspooS"^)
Crime Location:~^2Krj ! ^cdam^trSouth Salt Lake Ojy
Police Report. 07G0006Q9
Refer to CVR Claim
1556J 2
In accordance with Utah Cude Annotated 1987, Chapter S\, the Office of Crime Victim
Reparations is hereby giving notice that the State is subrogated to all the claimant/victim's rights
to receive or recover benefits or advantages for economic lass for which reparations ore
awarded.
The following represents verified expenses or losses incurifod bv the victWclaimant which
have been reimbursed by it ts office to date.
Medical
S989J4
Rent
$1,300.00
Rent Deposit
$500.00

Total Reimbursed to Dale:
You will be infenncd of anv further award made by this ailfca.

52,789.74

Huber
Repartition OiScer
(801)538-2364
350 East 500 South, Suite 200, Sal. La&e City, Utah 84111
telephone 8G1-23S-2&6Q • facainaU 801-5S3-4L27 * 1-8QQ-621-744I • wwwxrimenctim.utak.gcjv

LE,

SEP-20-2007 THU 08:59 AN SO SAL I LftKt KJLlUt

r. uo
P. 03/Q&

*HA NU, 1 ttUi 4i£ 3DU1T
hRX NC 1015334127

List of Payments
September 11,2007
Case Number

Victim
Address

Svc Date

Page

RE:lSi612

Officar JoAnnHuber

Cheree Woatherspoon

Lois Type

Num
1 Date
08/D3/2007
08/01/2007 Rent Deposit
0^01/2007 Rent

CPT
Billed
Code
Provider Andcrion P| opart?
SSOO.Oli
SSSQ.rl

Ins.

Adjustment

Paid To

$o,oo
50.00

Paid
Provider

so.oo

ssoooo

S0.0D

S650.OD
S14SO.00

Niim
2 Date
09/01/2007 Rem

O8/„0/2O07

Provider

Anderson Pi pporty
$650,01

Peld To
(9,00

so.oo

Provider
$650.00
S6SG.O0

Nuin
3 Date
01/23/2007 Medical

08/! 3/2007

Total Paid to Providers

Provider Cold Crois J.mbulDnce
A0429
$989 71

$2,789.74

To Cjaimanf

$0 00

Paid To
Provider
$0 00
S989.74
$989.74

$0.00

lo

FAX NC 1015334127

P. 04/05

State of Utah
O F J l C g OF CiOME VICTIM lEPABATIONS
RON, (JOB. GORDON, JR.
JON M, HUNTSMAN, JR.
GARY *L HERBERT

BROOKE ST JOHN
FAX: 412-360!

Restitution/
Subrogation Notice
September 11, 2007

Suspects:
Brown, Aro sand Kwanza
Date of Crime:
02/21/20D7
Type of Crim£>-^--—Agg awte^Assauit
Victim: T Spring Weai herspoon
Crime LocationT^—fHQz Adaigts^StTSouih Salt Lake
Police Report: 07G00609
Refer to CVR Claim
i 55613
In accordance with Utah G *de Annotated X9S7F Chapter 6L the Office of Crime Victim
Reparations is hereby givin j notice that the State is subrogited to all the claimant/victim's rights
to receive or recover benefils or advantages for economic ibss for which reparations are
awarded.
Tho following represents vi nfied expenses or losses ineuqfsd £>y mc victim/olaimani which
have been reimbursed by tfc s office to date.
Medical
$180.98

Totsrt Reimbursed to I>a| p:

S1S0.98

You wjll be informed of an; further award made by this oil ice,

incdje
1| Huber
Repalition Officer
(801)238-2364
850 East 500 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah &i!U
telephone 801-2S8-2S6Q • fiammiiB 80V53S-4127 - 1-B0Q-621-7414 * w\w.crimevictiin utfch.gov
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List ofPalfmeBts
September 11, 2007

Page

Case Number RE:155613
Victim Spring '^eaxhsrspoon
A44ress
""
"

Officer JoAnnHuber
Home
Work

SycDate
Lews Type
Num
1 Date
08/:i/2D07
01/23/2007 Medical

Total Paid to Provider?

CPT
BUIeei
Code Adjustment
Provider Gold CrowifmbuUmct
A0427
&989.7K
*0-00

S1WL98

To qiaimaiwt

Ins,
Paid
Paid To
Provider
$808.76
?ifiG_9g
S180.98

$0>00

lot

